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Court Litigation over Arbitration Agreements: Is it Time for a New Default Rule? 
Jack Graves
*
 
(forthcoming in The American Review of International Arbitration, Volume 23). 
Abstract 
 
Court litigation over the existence or validity of arbitration agreements is a major threat to the 
efficacy of international commercial arbitration. While New York Convention Article II(3) 
requires a court to “refer the parties to arbitration” when faced with a valid and effective 
arbitration agreement, it fails to provide any guidance with respect to the process for answering 
that question, thus leaving the issue to national law. A recalcitrant respondent may, therefore, 
have a variety of options for court challenges—based on a disparate array of national laws—in 
seeking to delay or at least complicate any claims subject to arbitration. This paper briefly 
surveys the problem, as well as a few current proposed solutions, and then proposes its own 
novel solution in the form of a new convention making arbitration the default legal rule for 
resolution of international commercial disputes. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Once upon a time, arbitration was seen as a means of avoiding courts in resolving parties‟ 
contract disputes. Today, however, an arbitration agreement all too often simply leads to a 
second dispute over the forum for resolving the first. This often obstructive skirmish—on the 
border between litigation and arbitration—arguably presents the single greatest threat to the 
effectiveness of commercial, business-to-business arbitration today. This threat is particularly 
acute in the context of international commercial arbitration, where recalcitrant parties may seek 
to invoke the jurisdiction of a broad array of national courts, with a broad variety of views 
regarding the proper role of courts with respect to the arbitral process. The primary tool for 
dealing with the interaction between national courts and the arbitral process is the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (the “New 
York Convention” or “Convention”). 
 
For over 50 years, the New York Convention has served two principle purposes, each of which 
relates to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims in lieu of bringing them in court. 
Article II generally requires national courts to defer to agreed upon arbitration proceedings, and 
Article III generally requires national courts to recognize and enforce any resulting arbitration 
awards. This paper will focus on the former. To what extent are national courts precluded from 
exercising jurisdiction over matters at least arguably subject to arbitration? 
 
This question requires a review of the “negative” aspect of “competence-competence.” While 
“positive” competence-competence provides an arbitral tribunal with the power to decide its own 
jurisdiction, the negative version goes further in precluding a court from addressing this same 
issue—at least as a preliminary matter. This negative version is subject to significant variation 
under different national arbitration laws. Thus, parties challenging the jurisdiction of arbitrators 
will often bring parallel challenges in court, adding to the overall cost of resolving the original 
dispute and reducing the efficiency of arbitral process. This potential for parallel court 
proceedings may also sometimes add further complexity and uncertainty to the process, such as 
the issuance of anti-suit injunctions and questions with respect to the preclusive effect of any 
given court determination on another, or on the arbitral process, itself. Concerns over these 
issues have only been heightened in matters involving EU parties after the West Tankers 
decision. All of this added complexity and uncertainty is seemingly at serious odds with the 
simple efficiency often touted as one of arbitration‟s most basic virtues. 
 
A strong version of “negative competence-competence” in Article II of the New York 
Convention could negate much of any detrimental effect of these national variations. However, 
the Convention‟s treatment of the issue in Article II(3), as drafted, is not sufficiently clear to 
serve this purpose. This paper will, therefore, explore the potential for addressing this arguable 
shortcoming of the Convention, also noting analogous attempts to “modernize” the “writing” 
requirement of Article II(2). Initially, two obvious alternatives present themselves: (1) amend or 
replace the New York Convention; or (2) provide interpretative guidance for the current 
Convention language that is likely to achieve the desired result. Each is briefly explored herein. 
This paper will, however, suggest a third alternative—a new convention designating arbitration 
as the default means of resolving international commercial disputes. 
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A couple of years ago, in addressing the modern trend away from any formal writing 
requirement, I initially suggested that perhaps it was time to start thinking about a convention 
that recognized normative preferences for arbitration of international commercial disputes and 
treated arbitration as the default legal rule—subject of course to any agreement to vest 
jurisdiction in a specific national court.
1
 Ultimately, many of the court “skirmishes” around 
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate arise from the fact that national courts remain the 
default forum—notwithstanding the “common wisdom” that arbitration is the norm for resolving 
disputes arising from cross-border commercial transactions. It would, thus, seem logical that 
disputes over the appropriate forum would be reduced by simply recognizing the normatively 
preferred arbitration forum as the legal default rule. 
 
2 LITIGATION OVER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND NEGATIVE 
COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE 
 
Likely the greatest single threat to modern commercial arbitration is the propensity of 
recalcitrant respondents to bring court proceedings in hopes of delaying the resolution of claims 
fairly subject to arbitration on the merits.
2
 To be sure, access to courts may often be valuable as 
an ancillary aid to arbitration proceedings in cases, for example, requiring early interim relief or 
eventual state-backed enforcement of an award.
3
 However, preemptive early court fights over 
arbitral jurisdiction are largely unnecessary and expensive dead weight, often significantly 
reducing the effectiveness and increasing the cost of the arbitral process.
4
 The only current way 
to avoid this problem is through the consistent application of a strong form of negative 
competence-competence, by virtue of which courts in any and all potentially available 
jurisdictions shall refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the parties‟ dispute—save only to compel 
the parties to arbitration.
5
 Unfortunately, the applicable legal doctrine governing the issue is 
anything but consistent. 
 
The problem of litigation over arbitration agreements is significantly exacerbated by disparate 
national laws governing potential litigation of a matter arguably subject to arbitration—either 
before the arbitral tribunal has been seized of the matter, or in parallel to the tribunal‟s 
deliberations (Part 2.1). In particular, the issue has become a very serious one in arbitration 
involving EU parties, based on recent decisions by the European Court of Justice applying the 
Brussels I Regulation to actions requesting court determination of whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate (Part 2.2). The obvious solution to such a disparity among national laws is to look to the 
                                                 
1
 Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing Requirement: Following Modern Trends towards Liberalization or Are We Stuck 
in 1958? 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 36 (Int‟l ed. 2009). I first heard this rather novel proposition in a talk delivered by 
Eugen Salpius, a former President of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (2005), when I invited him to speak at 
Stetson University School of Law in early 2005. See id., fn 27. Gilles Cuniberti has also made a very similar 
proposal. See generally, Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract—the Case for Default Arbitration in International 
Commercial Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT‟L L. J. 417 (2009). See also generally KARIM YOUSSEF, CONSENT IN 
CONTEXT: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2009) (suggesting arbitration as a normative 
default in the context of challenges arising in complex, multi-party commercial disputes). 
2
 See Jack Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of Statutory 
Default Legal Rules, 2 WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 227, 242 (2011). 
3
 See W. Michael Reisman and Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International 
Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. OF INT‟L ARB. 5, 7 (2010). 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
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New York Convention and Article II(3), which requires a court of any signatory country to “refer 
the parties to arbitration” if they have agreed to arbitrate, “unless it finds said agreement is null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. However, the scope of such inquiry is left 
unanswered by the Convention, thus largely leaving the issue to local national law (Part 2.3). 
 
2.1 THE BASIC PROBLEM AND AN ARRAY OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
An arbitration agreement includes an express positive promise to arbitrate any dispute within its 
scope. However, it also includes an implied negative promise not to go to court—except in aid of 
the arbitral process.
6
 The doctrine of “negative” competence-competence gives effect to this 
implied negative promise by limiting the authority of a national court to consider a matter 
arguably subject to arbitration prior to the arbitral tribunal‟s determination of whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question. This negative version of competence-competence is 
particularly important, because it often provides the only means by which the parties can enforce 
the benefit of their implied bargain not to go to court. The effectiveness of an anti-suit injunction 
is often questionable
7—especially in civil law jurisdictions8—and a claim for damages for breach 
of the arbitration agreement is often difficult to quantify. 
 
In its strongest form, the doctrine precludes any court consideration of a question then subject to 
ongoing arbitration proceedings.
9
 Early attempts to delay the proceedings are thereby 
discouraged; the parties are able to proceed in arbitration to a prompt and efficient resolution of 
their dispute on the merits; and any challenge to the arbitration agreement—and the resulting 
jurisdiction of the arbitrators—is generally fully preserved for later review by a court, if 
necessary.
10
 However, national laws on negative competence-competence differ significantly.
11
 
A brief sample of the variety of disparate approaches to the issue are surveyed by reference to 
French law (Part 2.1.1); U.S. law (Part 2.1.2); English law (Part 2.1.3); the UNCITRAL Model 
Law (Part 2.1.4); and German law (Part 2.1.5). 
 
2.1.1 A Strong Version of Negative Competence-Competence 
 
French law provides the strongest modern statutory version of competence-competence today. 
Prior to the constitution of the tribunal, after which the arbitrators are deemed seized of the 
dispute at issue,
12
 a court shall decline jurisdiction, unless “the arbitration agreement is 
manifestly void or manifestly not applicable.”13 If a court is presented with prima facie evidence 
                                                 
6
 See Julian Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International Arbitration Process? 24 AM. U. 
INT‟L L. REV. 489, 491 (2009) (explaining that a positive choice of final and binding arbitration is also a negative 
rejection of court adjudication). 
7
 See MARGARET MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 92-100 
(2008). 
8
 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 1041-43 (2009). 
9
 This preclusion of court consideration during ongoing arbitral proceedings is typically subject to an exception 
where the tribunal has answered any jurisdictional challenge in a preliminary decision. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Int‟l Commercial Arbitration, Article 16(3). 
10
 A party who initially challenges jurisdiction and loses its challenge before the arbitrators, but subsequently wins 
on the merits of the dispute will of course be unlikely to challenge that decision later in court. 
11
 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 1031 (2009) 
12
 French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title I, Chapter I, Article 1456. 
13
 French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title I, Chapter I, Article 1448 (emphasis supplied). 
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of an arbitration agreement between these parties that might reasonably include the dispute 
within its scope, then the court must decline jurisdiction. If the arbitral tribunal is already seized 
of the matter, then the court must decline jurisdiction without any review of the issue at that 
time.
14
 Notably, French law no longer requires a written arbitration agreement,
15
 so this prima 
facie test for a “manifest” lack of a valid and applicable arbitration agreement may present 
interesting challenges in its application to a purported oral arbitration agreement, the existence of 
which is contested. Whatever its new challenges, however, the French approach has traditionally 
provided consistently strong support for arbitration and minimal opportunities for delay through 
court proceedings. 
 
2.1.2 An Absolute (?) Version of Contractual Competence-Competence 
 
The United States Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”)16 makes absolutely no provision for 
competence-competence—either positive or negative.17 Instead, section 4 provides solely for 
court determination of any question as to whether the parties agreed to arbitration.
18
 However, 
the United States Supreme Court has endorsed a contractual version of competence-competence, 
which arguably gives the arbitral tribunal not only the first word on jurisdiction, but also the 
last.
19
 One might argue that this U.S. version gives rise to a stronger “negative” preclusion of 
court litigation than even the French approach. However, its precise contours are likely to be 
further litigated for some time to come.
20
 Perhaps most importantly, the continuing need to resort 
to the courts for statutory “guidance” under the FAA21 arguably undermines its effectiveness as a 
tool to give effect to the parties‟ implied desire to stay out of court.22 
 
2.1.3 A Flexible Version of Negative Competence-Competence 
 
The English approach provides significant autonomy to the parties and, in certain circumstances, 
discretion to the arbitral tribunal to allow for early court determination of whether the parties 
                                                 
14
 French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title I, Chapter I, Article 1448. 
15
 French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title II, Article 1507. 
16
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307. 
17
 JACK GRAVES AND YELENA DAVYDAN, COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE—AMERICAN STYLE in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION, 158 (Kroll, 
Mistelis, Perales and Rogers, eds. 2011). 
18
 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
19
 See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson , 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010); JACK GRAVES AND YELENA DAVYDAN, 
COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE—AMERICAN STYLE in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION, 166-67 (Kroll, Mistelis, Perales and Rogers, eds. 
2011) (elaborating on the broader likely effect of the Rent-A-Center decision). 
20
 Id. 
21
 See generally Margaret Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a Federal 
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006); Allied Bruce Terminix Co. v 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court had long ago 
“abandoned all pretence of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by 
case, an edifice of its own creation”). 
22
 See Jack Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of Statutory 
Default Legal Rules, 2 WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 227, 266-67 (2011). 
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have agreed to arbitrate a dispute. However, absent mutual consent of the parties or the consent 
of the arbitrators, early court consideration is barred.
23
 
 
2.1.4 The Lack of a Clear Standard under the UNCITRAL Model Law 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”) 
addresses the issue in Article 8. However, Article 8(1) provides little, if any guidance on the 
extent of any limits on early court consideration of the parties‟ purported arbitration agreement. 
Like New York Convention Article II(3), it requires any court to “refer the parties to arbitration” 
if they have agreed to arbitrate, “unless it finds said agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed.” However, the scope of such inquiry is not addressed. Article 8(2) 
seemingly goes further in expressly providing for the potential of parallel court proceedings, 
inasmuch as it allows both arbitration and court consideration of the arbitration agreement 
concurrently. As such, Model Law Article 8 provides only for a rather weak version of negative 
competence-competence and is, arguably, of less value in preventing unnecessary litigation over 
the arbitration agreement. 
 
2.1.5 An Option for Early Court Determination of Jurisdiction 
 
The German approach begins with the Model Law formulation described above, but adds a 
significant twist.
24
 While section 1032(1) German Code of Civil Procedure adopts the language 
of Article 8(1) of the Model Law, section 1032(2) allows either party to seek a declaratory court 
judgment with respect to the purported arbitration agreement—as long as the action is 
commenced before the tribunal is constituted.
25
 Thus, a party against whom a claim is brought in 
arbitration will virtually always have the opportunity to institute an early court challenge, 
assuming it does so promptly. The French and German approaches to negative competence-
competence arguably represent two ends of a diverse spectrum of approaches within Europe.
26
 
Whatever the previous challenges of this disparity among national laws, much worse was yet to 
come in the application of the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “Brussels I Regulation”) to 
court proceedings involving agreements to arbitrate. 
 
2.2 THE BASIC PROBLEM—JURISDICTION BRUSSELS I STYLE 
 
The Brussels I Regulation provides for a lis pendens rule giving sole jurisdiction to the court first 
seized.
27
 Whatever the pros or cons of this approach to jurisdiction in litigation, generally, the 
Brussels I Regulation further provides that it “shall not apply to arbitration.”28 However, in the 
                                                 
23
 English Arbitration Act (1996), Article 32; KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS 
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, 10 (Muller and Rigozzi, eds. 2010). 
24
 See German Code of Civil Procedure of 1998 (“ZPO”), section 1032. 
25
 KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCE-
COMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 8 (Muller and Rigozzi, eds. 
2010). 
26
 Id. at 14-15. 
27
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, Articles 27-29. 
28
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, Article 2(d). 
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much discussed (and largely maligned—at least within the arbitration community) West Tankers 
decision, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that an injunction issued by the 
English High Court barring litigation of the arbitration agreement in a previously commenced 
Italian court action was incompatible with the Brussels I Regulation—notwithstanding the fact 
that England was the seat of arbitration.
29
 
 
While the European Court of Justice agreed that the arbitration proceedings giving rise to the 
anti-suit injunction were outside of the scope of Brussels I, it further suggested that Brussels I 
may nevertheless preclude proceedings that “have consequences which undermine its 
effectiveness.”30 The Court went on to find that the previously filed Italian court action was 
subject to the exclusivity protection provided by Brussels I, and the English injunction would 
undermine that protection.
31
 Thus, the injunction was incompatible with the Brussels I 
Regulation. 
 
The West Tankers case left open a further troubling question. Could the courts of the seat of 
arbitration be deprived of jurisdiction to decide whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate if 
another court decided the issue first? This question was answered in the affirmative in National 
Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA.
32
 A Spanish court‟s determination that the parties had 
not incorporated into their contract an agreement providing for arbitration seated in England 
precluded any English Court from taking up the question and required dismissal of the arbitration 
proceedings.
33
 
 
Predictably, West Tankers and its progeny have led to numerous calls to amend the Brussels I 
Regulation.
34
 However, reaching agreement on the nature of such an amendment has been more 
difficult and subject to significant divergence in approaches. Most proposals seem to fall into 
two basic categories: (1) within the Brussels I Regulation, grant the courts of the seat the sole 
authority to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; or (2) clarify the unequivocal 
inapplicability of Brussels I to any matter in any way related to a matter subject to arbitration. 
Unfortunately, neither is without its challenges. 
 
Soon after the West Tankers decision, the EU Commission published a “green paper” on the 
review of the Brussels I Regulation.
35
 The green paper had been well underway prior to West 
Tankers and, inter alia, addressed “[t]he interface between the Regulation and arbitration,” based 
on a series of recommendations contained in the earlier 2007 Heidelberg Report.
36
 The green 
                                                 
29
 West Tankers, Inc. v. Allianz SpA, Case C-185/07, Court of Justice of the European Communities (10 Feb. 2009). 
30
 Id. at 1156-57. 
31
 Id. at 1157. 
32
 English Court of Appeal, 2 C.L.C. 1004 (2009). 
33
 See id. Such a result was, of course, fully predictable based on the rationale of West Tankers. See KLAUS SACHS 
AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE? in NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 20 (Muller and Rigozzi, eds. 2010). 
34
 See, e.g., generally Guido Carducci, Arbitration, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Lis Pendens under the European 
Jurisdiction Regulation and the New York Convention, 27 ARBITRATION INT‟L 171 (2011). 
35
 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2009) 175. 
36
 KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCE-
COMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 2-3 (Muller and Rigozzi, 
eds. 2010). 
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paper proposed to expand, selectively, the applicability of Brussels I to the extent its application 
would enhance and improve the efficacy of various court proceedings in support of arbitration.
37
 
It further proposed to grant priority to courts of the seat in determining whether the parties had 
agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question,
38
 a provision that would have likely avoided the West 
Tankers problem. However, the proposals contained in the green paper were protested by much 
of the international arbitration community. They were also firmly rejected in the report of the 
Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, which took the position that the whole 
matter of arbitration should be excluded from the scope of the Regulation.
39
 
 
In the EU Commission‟s proposal to amend the Regulation, published in December 2010, the 
only change related to arbitration was the addition of a new Article 29(4).
40
 This provision would 
require any court before which jurisdiction is contested on the basis of a purported arbitration 
agreement to stay jurisdiction in favor of court or arbitral proceedings in the seat of arbitration 
and to decline jurisdiction where the existence, validity, and effect of the arbitration agreement 
have been established.
41
 This proposal, essentially, took direct aim at the West Tankers decision 
and its potential to create “incentives for abusive litigation tactics” and thereby undermine the 
efficacy of the arbitral process.
42
 The divergence of views as to the desirability of any interface 
between arbitration and the Regulation was also recognized.
43
 However, the proposal ultimately 
provided this limited interface in hopes that it would “enhance the effectiveness of arbitration 
agreements in Europe, prevent parallel court and arbitration proceedings, and eliminate incentive 
for abusive litigation tactics.”44 Strongly divergent views nevertheless remain,45 and a brief 
exploration of a few of the issues is useful. 
 
The arbitration community is strongly protective of the New York Convention and will resist 
anything that might be seen as potentially undermining its effectiveness. To the extent that the 
Brussels I Regulation applies, in any way, to arbitration, the potential for conflict with the 
Convention naturally increases. For example, to the extent that the Regulation gives priority to a 
determination of the seat with respect to arbitral jurisdiction, would the application of the 
Regulation preclude the French practice of sometimes recognizing an award set aside in the seat 
                                                 
37
 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2009) 175, at 8-9, para. 7. Such proceedings 
might include provisional measures, which would be vested exclusively in the seat of arbitration. Additionally, a 
judgment merging an arbitration award might be given effect under the Regulation. 
38
 Id. 
39
 KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCE-
COMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 23 (Muller and Rigozzi, 
eds. 2010). 
40
 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), COM (2010) 748. 
The proposal would also amend Article 2 to provide for the applicability of the Regulation to arbitration solely as 
reflected in Article 29(4), as well as the accompanying provision of Article 33(3) defining when a tribunal is first 
seized of a matter. 
41
 Id. at 36, Article 29(4). 
42
 Id. at 4. 
43
 Id. at 5. 
44
 Id. at 9, para. 3.1.4. 
45
 See Draft Report of the European Parliament on the Regulation (recast) COM (2010) 748, dated 28 June, 2011 
(continuing to reject any application of the Regulation to proceedings subject to arbitration). 
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of arbitration?
46
 The New York Convention certainly allows this, but the proposed amendment to 
the Brussels I Regulation might not. After West Tankers, the potential for unexpected 
consequences of the application of Brussels I to arbitration are of course only heightened. 
 
The focus on giving priority to the arbitral seat is also subject to a potential flaw in that it 
assumes one can easily and immediately identify the seat. To the extent that the seat is clearly 
designated in the parties‟ agreement, this assumption is reasonable—but what if it is not? What if 
the parties fail to designate a seat or leave some ambiguity as to their choice? Typically, in such 
circumstances, the arbitrators will determine the seat,
47
 and one might not necessarily be able to 
determine the seat prior to that time. Thus, any approach that focuses on the seat in attempting to 
prevent abusive early litigation will necessarily sometimes fail. 
 
In contrast, an approach clarifying that the whole matter of arbitration is excluded from the scope 
of the Brussels I Regulation would entail complete reliance on national law and the New York 
Convention. We‟ve already discussed, above, the divergence in national laws with respect to the 
negative doctrine of competence-competence, so this brings us to a more thorough examination 
of the issue under the Convention. 
 
2.3 THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND ARTICLE II(3) 
 
The New York Convention has, without a doubt, formed the bedrock foundation upon which 
modern arbitration has been built. No one would seriously question its value in making 
arbitration awards broadly enforceable across national borders in most countries around the 
globe. Article III of the Convention provides for recognition and enforcement of an award, 
subject to simplified procedures contained in Article IV and a very narrow set of exceptions 
contained in Article V. This “enforcement” mechanism, operating in concert with the perceived 
neutrality of the process, is absolutely essential for effective international commercial arbitration. 
 
However, effective international commercial arbitration also requires a legal framework in which 
courts in any and all potentially available jurisdictions will predictably and consistently refuse to 
exercise jurisdiction over the parties‟ dispute—save only to compel the parties to arbitration.48 
The broad applicability of the New York Convention would seem to make it an ideal candidate 
for this role. Unfortunately, Article II(3) of the Convention is not particularly effective in this 
respect.
49
 In fact, it is worth noting here that the European Court of Justice, in West Tankers, had 
little problem in stating that its decision in support of the Italian Court‟s jurisdiction to consider 
                                                 
46
 KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCE-
COMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 18-19 (Muller and Rigozzi, 
eds. 2010). 
47
 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), Article 20; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Article 18. 
48
 See W. Michael Reisman and Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International 
Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. OF INT‟L ARB. 5, 7 (2010). 
49
 See Guido Carducci, Arbitration, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Lis Pendens under the European Jurisdiction 
Regulation and the New York Convention, 27 ARBITRATION INT‟L 171, 174 (2011) (in addressing European reliance 
on the New York Convention to address the West Tankers issue, noting that the Convention has been far more 
effective in terms of enforcement of arbitration awards and far less so in terms of avoiding parallel national court 
jurisdiction). 
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fully the existence, validity and scope of the arbitration agreement was fully consistent with 
Article II(3) of the Convention.
50
 
 
Article II(3) is crystal clear in requiring a court to refer the parties to arbitration in a proper case. 
However, it provides no guidance as to the appropriate methodology or extent of any inquiry by 
the court.
51
 Should a court refuse to consider any case in which the arbitrators are seized of the 
matter? And what does it mean for the arbitrators to be “seized of the dispute”? Does this occur 
only after the tribunal has been fully constituted, as provided by French law?
52
 Or does it occur 
as soon as the process of constituting the tribunal has begun, as provided by the proposed 
amendment to the Brussels I Regulation?
53
 Or might a tribunal even be deemed seized upon 
“commencement” of arbitration proceedings? The question becomes even more problematic if 
court litigation is commenced before an arbitral tribunal is seized of the matter (however 
“seized” or “seised” might be defined). 
 
Where a party seeks dismissal of a court action arguing that the dispute is subject to an 
arbitration agreement, what is the proper level of court inquiry at this time? Should the court 
make a full determination of the issue, or should it simply conduct a prima facie review, staying 
or declining jurisdiction unless the lack of an effective arbitration agreement is “manifest.” This 
standard of review is particularly important in cases like West Tankers, where the court in 
question is not a court of the seat of arbitration. While one might reasonably argue in favor an 
early court determination by a court of the seat, as provided for under German law, there is rarely 
any redeeming basis for early review by any other court. In the vast majority of cases, another 
court may solely address the arbitration agreement in the context of an enforcement proceeding. 
However, the availability of court litigation outside of the seat provides ample opportunity for 
mischief and abuse in efforts to delay proper arbitration proceedings. 
 
While a discussion of global comparative court jurisdiction is far beyond the scope of this article, 
it can safely be said that, absent an arbitration agreement, any given commercial dispute will 
typically be subject to the jurisdiction of at least two different courts.
54
 A recalcitrant respondent, 
therefore, need only choose the “least expeditious” court from among those with potential 
jurisdiction and then contest the existence, validity, or scope of the arbitration agreement before 
that court—potentially delaying the ultimate resolution of the dispute for an indeterminate period 
                                                 
50
 See West Tankers, Inc. v. Allianz SpA, Case C-185/07, Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1158 (10 
Feb. 2009). 
51
 SCHRAMM, GEISINGER, PINSOLLE in HERBERT KRONKE (ED.), RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, 109-10 (2010). 
52
 See French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title I, Chapter I, Article 1456 (providing that a tribunal is seized 
“upon the arbitrators‟ acceptance of their mandate”). 
53
 See European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), COM 
(2010) 748, Article 33(3) (providing that “an arbitral tribunal is deemed to be seised when a party has nominated an 
arbitrator or when a party has requested the support of an institution, authority or a court for the tribunal's 
constitution”). 
54
 Cf. Guido Carducci, Arbitration, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Lis Pendens under the European Jurisdiction 
Regulation and the New York Convention, 27 ARBITRATION INT‟L 171, 176 (2011) (addressing the potential in 
Europe where two options are generally available). 
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of time.
55
 The New York Convention, as drafted, provides little, if any, assistance in preventing 
this particular problem. 
 
There is also a relatively new—and particularly thorny—issue that is worth noting at this 
juncture. Even if a court is willing to limit its review under Article II(3) to a prima facie inquiry, 
what is the nature of a prima facie review of a purported oral agreement to arbitrate? Modern 
arbitration law increasingly recognizes such oral arbitration agreements.
56
 However, resolving a 
factual dispute over what was said between the parties would seemingly require a far deeper 
inquiry than simply reviewing the language of a purported written agreement. Even more 
importantly, the New York Convention does not recognize oral agreements to arbitrate under 
Article II(2), so Article II(3) would not be available to a party challenging court proceedings 
over a matter subject to an oral arbitration agreement. In fact, Articles II(2) and II(3) arguably 
present the strongest basis for any suggestion that it may be time to consider amending the New 
York Convention. 
 
3 ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM THROUGH ARTICLE II(3) OF THE 
NEW YORK CONVENTION 
 
To the extent we wish to provide for a uniform and consistent solution to the problem of court 
litigation over arbitration agreements, the New York Convention seemingly provides the ideal 
vehicle in terms of its extraordinarily broad application. However, in attempting to resolve the 
issue through the Convention, we face two significant challenges. First, how do we specifically 
propose to solve the problem (Part 3.1)? Second, how do we bring about the selected approach 
under the Convention (Part 3.2)? 
 
3.1 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
 
To some degree, the range of potential solutions under the New York Convention mirrors some 
of those being considered with respect to the West Tankers issue under Brussels I. Should a court 
be limited to a prima facie review? Should a court be required to conduct any review of the 
arbitration agreement under the law of the arbitral seat? Should exclusive jurisdiction be vested 
in the courts of the seat? 
 
At the ICCA International Arbitration Conference in 2008, Albert Jan van den Berg proposed, on 
the fiftieth birthday of the New York Convention, that the time had come for its 
“modernization.”57 The very first issue he raised was the revision of Articles II(3).58 His 
hypothetical draft revision would require any court to refer the parties to arbitration, absent proof 
that “there is prima facie no valid arbitration agreement under the law of the country where the 
                                                 
55
 As William Gladstone reminded us over 100 years ago, “justice delayed, is justice denied.” 
56
 See French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title II, Article 1507; UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 7 Option 1 
(requiring a “record” of content, but allowing for oral consent) or Option 2 (no form requirement of any kind). See 
also Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing Requirement: Following Modern Trends towards Liberalization or Are We 
Stuck in 1958? 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 36 (Int‟l ed. 2009) (more fully addressing the revisions of Model Law Article 
7). 
57
 See generally Albert Jan van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of 
Arbitration Agreements and Awards, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 14, 649 (van den Berg, ed. 2009). 
58
 Id. at 649. The second issue raised was the modernization of the writing requirement in Article II(2). 
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award will be made.”59 There is certainly some merit to this “choice of law” approach, inasmuch 
as any subsequent enforcement proceedings would necessarily address any challenge to the 
arbitration agreement under the law of the place in which the award was made.
60
 However, it 
also raises a number of difficult issues. 
 
At the same 2008 conference, Emmanuel Gaillard put forth the opposing view that the New York 
Convention should be left in its current form.
61
 He further suggested that, even if one were to 
revise the Convention, any focus on the “law of the seat” was ill advised.62 As explained earlier 
in addressing EU proposals to limit jurisdiction to the courts of the seat, the seat of any 
arbitration may not yet be known at the time of any court consideration.
63
 Moreover, the 
application of what will likely be foreign law is often difficult and may require lengthy hearings, 
perhaps including experts, to determine its content.
64
 Finally, the recent Dallah decision reminds 
us that two different courts may reach inconsistent results, even when purporting to apply the 
same body of law.
65
 
 
While agreeing with the prima facie standard of review proposed by van den Berg, Gaillard 
suggested a “simple assessment on the basis of generally accepted practices,” in lieu of a 
potentially more challenging and lengthy attempt to apply a specific national law.
66
 There is 
indeed much to be said for such a simple, generic approach to a prima facie review. However, it 
fails to address at least one major issue—that of oral agreements to arbitrate. 
 
It is doubtful that the recognition and validation of oral arbitration agreements is yet a “generally 
accepted practice.” Thus, a German court, for example, might find an arbitration agreement 
formally invalid in its prima facie review—notwithstanding the fact that a court in the French 
seat of the arbitration would not impose any form requirement.
67
 Admittedly, the German court 
might then go on to evaluate the purported arbitration agreement in greater detail, assuming it 
                                                 
59
 Id. at 667. 
60
 See New York Convention, Article V.1.(a). 
61
 See generally Emmanuel Gaillard, The Urgency of Not Revising the New York Convention, ICCA CONGRESS 
SERIES NO. 14, 689 (van den Berg, ed. 2009). Typical reasons for resistance to revision are that (1) the Convention 
is currently very effective; (2) change will be difficult, at best; and (3) the costs of any changes may exceed any 
gains. 
62
 Id. at 693-94. 
63
 Emmanuel Gaillard, The Urgency of Not Revising the New York Convention, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 14, 
689, 694 (van den Berg, ed. 2009). 
64
 Id. A perfect example of Gaillard‟s concerns can be found in Filanto v. Chilewich, 789 F.Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992), in which an Italian seller and a New York buyer disputed the existence of an arbitration agreement that 
clearly provided for a seat in Moscow, Russia. The court struggled mightily with the issue under the CISG, federal 
common law (whatever that might be), and the New York Convention, and it likely got to the right result, sending 
the parties to arbitration. However, it never once mentioned Russian national arbitration law—likely because neither 
of the parties ever suggested its application, thereby requiring proof as to its content. 
65
 See, e.g, Gary Born, Dallah and the New York Convention, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (7 April 2011). In the Dallah 
case, the UK Supreme Court refused to enforce a French award against the government of Pakistan, having 
determined that Pakistan was not a party to the arbitration agreement, while the Paris Court of Appeals reached a 
contrary decision applying the same French law of the arbitral seat. In theory, the focus on the law of the seat under 
New York Convention Article V(1)(a) should preclude differing outcomes on the question of whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate. In this case, however, it did not. Id. 
66
 Id. 694. 
67
 As suggested earlier, the nature of a prima facie review of an oral agreement to arbitrate is not entirely clear. 
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could determine the seat and apply its law to any full determination. However, this “simple” 
approach to a prima facie review is not necessarily as “simple” as it might first appear. 
 
Alternatively, instead of focusing on the standard of review, the Convention could be amended to 
grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the seat of arbitration,
68
 effectively providing for an 
anti-suit injunction barring any other courts from addressing the issue.
69
 This approach avoids 
any problems associated with choice of law or standard of review. It doesn‟t necessarily preclude 
early resort to the courts on the issue of arbitral jurisdiction, as in the case of a German seat, but 
that is a choice within the control of the parties when they choose a seat. Early court resolution—
in that instance—therefore seems more consistent with the parties‟ agreement. 
 
This exclusive jurisdiction approach, however, remains subject to problems when the seat is not 
yet known. Moreover, the exclusive jurisdiction approach may bar a court from addressing the 
arbitration agreement
70—even if it involves a local citizen and a matter of fundamental public 
policy that would invalidate the arbitration agreement.
71
 Presumably, such a jurisdictional bar 
would be subject to a reasonable array of exceptions. However, the contours of such exceptions 
may be very difficult to define in a manner that doesn‟t simply reopen the door for mischievous 
“torpedoes.” 
 
In short, there is no single, easy answer to the question of how to remedy the current deficiencies 
of Article II(3). However, even if agreement can be reached regarding desirable changes, one 
must yet determine how to bring about these changes. 
 
3.2 MEANS FOR BRINGING ANY SOLUTION ABOUT 
 
Any proposal for actual modification of the existing language of the New York Convention is 
typically met with strong resistance. When UNCITRAL revised the writing requirement of 
Model Law, Article 7, in 2006, some suggested that the writing requirement of Article II(2) of 
the New York Convention ought to be modified in order to bring it in line with modern trends, as 
reflected in revised Article 7—at least as to Option I.72 However, amending the actual language 
                                                 
68
 See Guido Carducci, Arbitration, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Lis Pendens under the European Jurisdiction 
Regulation and the New York Convention, 27 ARBITRATION INT‟L 171, 186 (2011). 
69
 See Margaret Moses, Barring the Courthouse Door? Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration (in 
progress—unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
70
 SCHRAMM, GEISINGER, PINSOLLE in HERBERT KRONKE (ED.), RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, 109 (2010). 
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 For example, under most national laws, an insolvent party has no capacity to conclude an arbitration agreement. 
Would a court be precluded from addressing this issue simply because the arbitration agreement designated a 
different seat? Arguably, it should not be. Notably, in his hypothetical revised New York Convention, Albert Jan 
van den Berg proposed to add public policy as a basis for non-recognition of an arbitration agreement. Albert Jan 
van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and 
Awards, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 14, 667 (van den Berg, ed. 2009). This is of course fully consistent with the 
existing public policy exception of New York Convention Article V, but would allow a court to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement offensive to such public policy, even in the absence of local enforcement proceedings. 
72
 Option 1 retains a requirement of a record of “content,” but relaxes the requirement for a record of “consent,” 
while Option II goes further and eliminates any requirement as to form. Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing 
Requirement: Following Modern Trends towards Liberalization or Are We Stuck in 1958? 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 36, 
39 (Int‟l ed. 2009). 
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of the Convention was deemed too difficult at the time. Instead, along with the revision of 
Article 7, UNCITRAL included a resolution recommending an interpretation of the existing 
language of Article II(2) of the Convention in a manner that might, essentially, be more 
consistent with revised Article 7 of the Model Law.
73
 Perhaps, a similar approach might be taken 
with respect to Article II(3) of the Convention. 
 
A resolution promulgated by UNCITRAL could certainly stipulate, for example, a prima facie 
standard of review, which might be equally useful with respect to the analogous language in 
Article 8(1) of the Model Law. The actual language of Article II(3) of the Convention would not 
require any change, and the challenge of amending a Convention with more than 140 signatories 
would be avoided. The problem, of course, with this proposed solution is the questionable effect 
of a simple interpretive resolution. To the extent that one seeks to use Article II(3) to bar abusive 
litigation as a delaying tactic, adding further uncertainty to the process seems unwise. 
 
Arguably, any effective change in the treatment of the issues addressed (or not addressed) by 
Article II(3) of the Convention will likely have to come through amendment, as recently 
suggested by Albert Jan van den Berg. However, if one is going to attempt to overcome all of the 
near certain difficulties of revising this 50+ year old foundation of international commercial 
arbitration, perhaps one should “think big” in hopes of finding an approach that might take us 
through at least the next 50 years. 
 
4 ARBITRATION AS A DEFAULT IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 
 
The commencement of court litigation of a matter subject to arbitration is often characterized as 
a “torpedo” intended to “sink” or at least complicate and delay the arbitration proceedings.74 
Guido Carducci explains in a recent article addressing, inter alia, the problem of such 
“torpedoes.” 
 
Preventing the „torpedoing‟ of international arbitration should be supported. 
However, it is a fact that preventing „torpedoes‟ which operate by selected court 
proceedings finds in its way the principle of judicial protection for regularly filed 
claims, which opposes any „torpedo net.‟75 
 
In short, this “torpedo” is often effective in thwarting international commercial arbitration 
proceedings because the applicable legal framework fails to recognize arbitration as the default 
mechanism for such “regularly filed claims” Instead, the current default jurisdictional rule for 
“regularly filed claims” involving international commercial transactions is national courts—a 
default that is fully inconsistent with normative practices. Instead of attempting to weave an ever 
tighter torpedo net against a contrary default mechanism for resolving international commercial 
disputes in court, why not simply recognize the obvious and make arbitration the default? With a 
default rule providing for arbitration, a court would have no basis for exercising jurisdiction 
absent an affirmative agreement of the parties. Thus, the effectiveness of court actions as a 
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 Id. at 38. 
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 See, e.g., Guido Carducci, Arbitration, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Lis Pendens under the European Jurisdiction 
Regulation and the New York Convention, 27 ARBITRATION INT‟L 171, 176-77 (2011). 
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means to delay or obstruct arbitration proceedings would be substantially diminished, if not 
largely eliminated. 
 
Arbitration is almost certainly the normative method for resolving disputes in the majority of 
international commercial transactions.
76
 As such, this normative reality should be recognized 
through a default legal rule providing for arbitration in the absence of any agreement to the 
contrary (Part 4.1). While such a change of the default rule from national courts to arbitration 
would certainly be significant, the change could arguably be accomplished with a few relatively 
small steps beyond the status quo (Part 4.2). 
 
4.1 ARBITRATION AS THE DEFAULT 
 
“[I]nternational arbitration is the natural and preferred means of resolving international business 
disputes.”77 Arbitration is uniquely suited to cross border commercial transactions in that it 
provides for neutral resolution of disputes and effective enforcement of resulting awards. It also 
“typically produces efficient, expert resolution” of these disputes.78 Thus, “there are serious 
reasons to presume, as a general matter and absent contrary indications, that commercial parties 
are predisposed to enter into international arbitration agreements, in order to obtain the benefits 
that such agreements provide.”79 
 
The quotations in the foregoing paragraph are drawn from Gary Born‟s spirited defense of a 
“presumption” in favor of arbitration, in lieu of a more “neutral” approach, such as that applied 
to the issue of consent in contracts, generally.
80
 Born makes clear, however, that “„a party cannot 
be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit,‟ and that 
pro-arbitration policies cannot substitute for the parties‟ consent.”81 Or can they? Or, more to the 
point, could consent be defined more broadly than one might initially intuit? 
 
Consent might be found in a variety of contexts. Parties to a particular contract may be deemed 
to have impliedly consented to certain majoritarian normative terms. Consent may also be 
triggered by a positive rule of law. Each of these bases of consent is more fully explored below. 
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 See, e.g., GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 653 (2009); but see Alan Scott Rau, 
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574, 582 (1960). 
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4.2 A SMALL, THOUGH SIGNIFICANT, STEP BEYOND THE STATUS QUO 
 
A knowledgeable observer of U.S. jurisprudence interpreting and applying the Federal 
Arbitration Act might reasonably argue that, as a practical matter, the courts have already left 
consent far behind in deciding issues of arbitral jurisdiction.
82
 For example, a party who chooses 
institutional arbitration seated in the United States under the ICDR Rules is deemed to have 
“clearly and unmistakably consented” to delegate any jurisdictional decision to the arbitrators—
and arguably has given up any right to ever raise the issue in court—solely by virtue of a 
provision within the chosen institutional rules.
83
 U.S. Consumers are often deemed to have 
“consented” to arbitration agreements that are largely unread, generally misunderstood, and often 
provided after the consumer‟s agreement to take and pay for the goods or services in question.84 
Nor is the U.S. approach particularly out of the mainstream, with respect to business-to-business 
commercial arbitration. Under all modern national arbitration laws, a party whose contractual 
consent is induced by fraud is deemed to have “consented” to the arbitration clause within the 
main contract.
85
 Perhaps even more remarkably, a compulsory application by an athlete to 
compete in his or her chosen sport binds the athlete to arbitration of any related disputes before 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport.
86
 In short, real “consent” arguably ceased to be the touchstone 
of arbitration law some time ago.
87
 
 
Any general “pro-arbitration” presumption of consent is likely even stronger in the case of 
international commercial arbitration. Thus, it would seem to be a relatively small step from the 
current presumption to a fully independent presumption of “consent” to arbitration of an 
international commercial dispute, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary (Part 4.2.1). 
Moreover, the basic outlines of a possible template for a default legal regime can be found in the 
existing Panama Convention (Part 4.2.2).  
 
4.2.1 A Significant, and Perhaps Controversial, Presumption of “Consent” 
 
Any suggestion for treatment of arbitration as a “default rule” for dispute resolution raises 
obvious and significant questions regarding “consent.” It is often repeated that consent is the 
cornerstone of arbitration, and this same “consent” mantra was recently invoked by Professor 
Alan Scott Rau in seemingly dismissing the idea of a rule making arbitration the default means 
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 U.S. courts call this the “arbitrability” question, though the term has a much narrowing meaning globally. 
83
 See Jack Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of Statutory 
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of international commercial dispute resolution as a proposal “displaying analytical confusion.”88 
However, “consent” comes in many forms. 
 
An international commercial transaction is always based on consent, as a matter of universal 
contract law. The vast majority of contract regimes provide a broad array of default terms, 
typically based on normative business behavior.
89
 In one respect, an agreement to arbitrate 
disputes arising under the parties‟ main contract is no more than a typical majoritarian default 
contract term provided in a variety of contractual contexts.
90
 Admittedly, this is arguably 
inconsistent with the doctrine of separability, but that doctrine would be rendered largely 
unnecessary if arbitration were the default.
91
 
 
Moreover, tacit “consent” may be found in the parties‟ failure to contract around an established 
default legal rule, provided (1) the parties had reason to know of the default rule; and (2) the cost 
of contracting around the default rule is not prohibitive.
92
 Any effective default rule providing 
for international commercial would almost certainly have to take the form of a well promoted 
and publicized convention, so international business people would seemingly have reason to 
know of its existence. While negotiating a dispute resolution provision can sometimes have 
higher than normal transaction costs, the availability of the Hague Convention of Choice of 
Court Agreement, providing a well-structured legal regime for agreeing on court adjudication 
instead of arbitration, would seem to reduce such costs, at least to some degree. 
 
In fact, parties could indeed opt out of arbitration in favor of court adjudication, as long as they 
chose a specific court. Assuming broad support of the Hague Convention on Choice of Courts, 
the parties‟ choice would be fully effective. Thus, contracts fully addressing issues of dispute 
resolution would be unaffected by this change in the default rule. The change in default would 
apply only to parties who fail to provide for a dispute resolution forum in their agreement. One 
might reasonably ask if this effect will fall disproportionately on smaller, less sophisticated 
parties. If so, a default rule providing for arbitration is even more essential. 
 
Large multinational corporations typically have a significant presence in many of the countries in 
which they do business—including a legal team. Thus, they are much more likely to be able to 
take advantage of a contracting partner‟s own local courts in the event litigation arises. 
Moreover, the large multinational corporation, as a defendant, is more likely to have significant 
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assets in multiple jurisdictions, thus providing a potential plaintiff with a variety of possible 
options from which to choose. While arbitration remains the normative preference, a large multi-
national corporation is somewhat less affected when required to resort to national courts in the 
absence of an effective dispute resolution agreement. 
 
In contrast, the small to mid-sized business will likely prefer to rely on its local legal team, and it 
will likely have assets only in its home country. This small to mid-sized business is precisely the 
sort of party that finds itself between the proverbial “rock and a hard place” in the event a dispute 
arises in the absence of an effective arbitration agreement. Does the plaintiff bring suit at home 
and then try to collect? Or, conversely, does the plaintiff—often at considerable expense—sue in 
the defendant‟s home courts and just hope to be treated in a fair and unbiased manner? In many 
cases, neither option will provide a particularly viable choice, and a party may end up 
abandoning its claim entirely. It is this small to mid-size business that will almost certainly 
benefit the most from a default rule providing for arbitration.
93
 Thus, we may reasonably find 
elements of “consent” to arbitration of international commercial disputes based on traditional 
contract principles applicable to majoritarian default rules, generally. 
 
Moreover, a convention providing for arbitration as a default rule and ratified by each 
contracting state would provide a positive legal rule, through which one might reasonably find 
implied “consent.” By way of analogy, a U.S. court addressing personal jurisdiction based on the 
principle of “consent,” may employ a “legal fiction” in finding such “consent” on the theory that 
a foreign corporation “consents” to submit to jurisdiction in consequence of doing local 
business.”94 In a similar manner, a party engaging in a transaction within the scope of the 
proposed convention would be deemed to have “consented” to its application and, thereby, 
“consented” to arbitrate any disputes arising thereunder. 
 
In fact, one might reasonably suggest that an implication of consent to a default arbitration 
regime in an international commercial transaction is far more reasonable than an implication that 
parties impliedly consent to substantive international law under similar circumstances. And yet, 
we bind parties buying or selling goods across national borders to the substantive default rules of 
the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (the “CISG”), and presumably 
believe they are better off for it. 
 
Finally, any proposal that would deprive parties of their right to court access must address the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees such access.
95
 One might reasonably 
question whether a default rule providing for arbitration of international commercial disputes, in 
the absence of traditional notions of express consent, could reasonably be reconciled with this 
convention. A thorough examination of the potential application of the convention is beyond the 
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scope of this article. However, the Swiss Supreme Court‟s treatment of “consent” to arbitration 
by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) may provide a path to such reconciliation. 
 
An athlete may be bound to CAS arbitration based on completion of a compulsory application to 
compete—even as a matter of incorporation by reference where the arbitration agreement is 
embodied in the rules of the athletes sport, to which the athlete agrees as a pre-requisite to 
participation in that sport.
96
 This apparent departure from more traditional notions of consent is 
justified in the context of sports matters because CAS arbitration is aimed at “favouring the 
prompt settlement of disputes, particularly in sports-related matters, by specialised arbitral 
tribunals presenting sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality.”97 In a similar 
manner, one might reasonably suggest that arbitration favors prompt settlement of international 
commercial disputes by tribunals specializing in such commercial matters and providing for 
sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality. In fact, one might reasonably suggest 
that, in the context of a cross-border transaction, an arbitral tribunal is more likely to insure such 
expeditious, specialized, impartial resolution of any such dispute. Moreover, national courts 
would retain the authority to review any arbitral award based on due process or public policy 
concerns, much as in the case of the New York Convention today. Thus, in the same manner that 
an athlete‟s decision to compete gives rise to an obligation to arbitrate disputes—without running 
afoul of the European Convention on Human Rights—a commercial party‟s decision to conduct 
business across national borders would give rise to an obligation to arbitrate all related disputes, 
absent an agreement to the contrary. 
 
Ultimately, whether we find consent through contract principles addressing normative default 
rules, imply consent from the parties‟ actions in engaging in a transaction governed by a positive 
default rule of law, or both, it cannot reasonably be said that a default legal regime providing for 
arbitration of international commercial disputes would be wholly lacking in any form of 
“consent.” Of course, as with many new ideas, the devil is in the details. Fortunately, a few ideas 
for these details can be found in an existing convention. 
 
4.2.2 The Panama Convention and a “Bare Bones” Arbitration Agreement—a 
Pre-existing Template for a Default Legal Regime 
 
The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama 
Convention”) applies to arbitration agreements between parties from contracting states within 
North and South America—effectively displacing the New York Convention in those instances.98 
While unfortunately omitting any provision directly addressing parallel national court 
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proceedings,
99
 the Panama Convention introduces one particular innovation not found in the 
New York Convention.
100
 It provides that, in the event the parties have not agreed upon any 
institutional or other arbitration rules, the rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Commission (“IACAC”) will govern the arbitration.101 These rules are virtually identical to the 
original UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976).
102
 
 
Thus, if the parties simply agree to final and binding arbitration of any dispute related to the 
instant contract, their agreement is fully effective, and they are deemed to have impliedly 
“consented” to ad hoc arbitration under a set of rules virtually identical to the original 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In a similar fashion, parties deemed to have chosen arbitration by 
default under a new convention could be further deemed to have agreed to ad hoc arbitration
103
 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as a default set of rules to govern their dispute.
104
 Of 
critical importance is Article 6, providing for the designation of an appointing authority by the 
Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.
105
 Thus, the entire 
arbitral process would typically take place without any court involvement—even if the 
respondent refused to cooperate in that process.
106
 Of course, an effective arbitration regime 
would continue to require a seat—irrespective of whether chosen in advance by the parties in an 
express arbitration agreement, or selected later by the arbitrators.
107
 
 
With a default arbitration regime for dispute resolution, and the application of the UNCITRAL 
Rules in the absence of an express party agreement, the issues of lis pendens and the potential for 
parallel proceedings virtually disappear. In the case of every international commercial 
transaction, the parties would be bound to resolve their disputes: (1) in a mutually agreed upon 
national court; (2) through a mutually agreed upon arbitral process; or (3) through a default 
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arbitral process overseen, as necessary, by the Permanent Court of Arbitration where the parties 
are unable to agree to the contrary. The only reason for early resort to national courts would 
likely be for preliminary injunctive relief, which typically requires a party to seek relief in a 
specific court in the likely place of enforcement. Thus, the proverbial “torpedo” is largely, if not 
fully, defused. 
 
As an additional benefit, a default arbitration regime would solve many of the existing 
challenges related to joinder of parties. Absent an agreement to the contrary, all parties to a given 
transaction or occurrence could effectively be joined in a single arbitration proceeding. This 
would arguably go a long way towards resolving a significant problem with the existing 
arbitration regime based solely on express consent.
108
 
 
Admittedly, the idea of arbitration as a default rule likely conjures up prospects of significant 
political challenges. However, the principles contained in the New York Convention itself likely 
conjured up significant initial political challenges in the face of early 20
th
 century judicial 
hostility towards arbitration.
109
 Often, the success of this sort of “sea change” may be dependent 
on its timing. Today, in a global economy looking for savings in public spending, perhaps the 
time is right to relieve national courts of the burden of financing unplanned and often abusive 
litigation involving arbitration agreements, as well as unplanned litigation of international 
commercial disputes, generally.
110
 Litigation in which the parties fail to agree in advance on the 
forum will almost always be more complex, protracted, and expensive. In contrast, arbitration is 
almost fully self-sustaining from a financial perspective, relying very little on public courts 
except where personal “coercion” of a party is necessary. Perhaps the time has arrived to begin 
to take the next step in effective resolution of international commercial disputes. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
Albert Jan van den Berg was right. After more than 50 years, it is time for a new convention. The 
New York Convention has been a truly outstanding success, but the needs of modern 
international commercial arbitration extend beyond the Convention‟s extraordinarily successful 
provisions for recognition and enforcement of awards. The West Tankers case is, of course, only 
one of the sign posts pointing towards the need for modernization, but its challenges further 
illuminate the difficulty in solving today‟s challenges while continuing to treat international 
commercial arbitration as the “exception” instead of the “rule.” The international business 
community needs to move beyond mere revisions of the New York Convention. Instead, we need 
a new convention that fully recognizes arbitration as the default legal rule for resolution of 
international commercial disputes. Admittedly, one can only guess whether the international 
community is ready to give serious consideration to such a rule. This article simply suggests that 
the time has arrived to have the discussion. 
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